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This Note examines the need for guidelines regulating TNC activity, and the importance of
formulating a principle of host state treatment that will fulfill the objectives of the Draft Code. The
three views on host state treatment and the support each view finds in international law are ana-
lyzed. From this analysis, it is concluded that only the LDC view, modified to require host states
to clearly state developmental plans, is based on principles that are recognized by and compatible
with the interests of all three blocs.
HOST STATE TREATMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: FORMULATION OF A STANDARD FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpo-
rations (Draft Code) has been negotiated under the auspices of the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTC)
since 1977.' The creation of rules governing host state treatment of
1. Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/
C.10/1982/6 annex (1982) [hereinafter cited as Draft Code]. E.S.C. Res. 1721, 53 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. E/5209 (1972), requested the Secretary General to
appoint a Group of Eminent Persons to study the role of transnational corporations in world
society. For the report by that Group, see Multinational Corporations in World Develop-
ment, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973) [hereinafter cited as World Development].
For an analysis of the recommendations for international action proposed by the Group,
see The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations,
U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev.l, ST/ESA/6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Impact]. For state response
to the report of the Group of Eminent Persons, see The Impact of Transnational Corporations
on the Development Process and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5595 (1974) (views
of states on the report of the Group of Eminent Persons) [hereinafter cited as Views of States].
The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations is a subsidiary organ of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, established unanimously by E.S.C. Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1A) at 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add.1 (1974). The Commission assists the Economic
and Social Council in fulfilling its responsibilities in the field of transnational corporations by
"[c]onducting inquiries on the activities of transnational corporations, making studies, pre-
paring reports and organizing panels for facilitating discussions among relevant groups."
E.S.C. Res. 1913, supra, at 3, para. 3(d).
At its first substantive session in 1975, the Commission gave top priority to the formation
of a Code to be observed in dealing with transnational corporations (TNC's). Commission on
Transnational Corporations, Report of the First Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.1O/6 para. 9, at 2
(1975). It solicited lists of areas of concern and issues to be considered in Code negotiations.
See Issues Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.1O/17 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Issues Involved]; Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report of
the Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.10116 annex 1-4 (1976) [ hereinafter cited as Report on
the Second Session]. The Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct was
established in 1977 by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations in accordance
with paragraph 1(d) of E.S.C Res. 1913, supra, para. 1(d).
In May of 1983, the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct adopted
a report containing negotiated texts of all substantive parts of the Code. See Draft Code,
supra.
The Draft Code is composed of six main parts. Part one, when completed, will contain
the preamble and objectives, Draft Code, supra, at 2; part two, the provisions on definitions
and scope of application, id. paras. 1-5; part three, the provisions on the activities of the
TNC's, id. paras. 6-46; part four outlines the treatment TNC's are to receive from host
governments, id. paras. 47-58; part five addresses intergovernmental cooperation, id. paras.
59-65; part six outlines national and international implementation of the Code, id. paras. 66-
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71. See also Transnational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46
para. 345, at 110 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Third Survey] (the Third Survey is an in depth
study on all major aspects of TNC activity and impact in world society, issued by the UN
Centre on Transnational Corporations).
Among the provisions which have been fully agreed upon are: Adherence to socio-
cultural values, Draft Code, supra, para. 12; ownership and control, id. paras. 21-25;
balance of payments, id. paras. 26-32; environmental protection, id. paras. 41-43. Approxi-
mately five or six major areas remain in dispute. Completion of the Formulation of the Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1983/S/2 para. 24, at 9
(1983).
Host state treatment of TNC's is a major area of conflict still outstanding in formulating
the Code. See infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text. A host state is defined as "the
recipient nation of any foreign direct investment." C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 10 (1982). Other major areas of conflict still outstanding are:
1. The Legal Nature of the Code: Many delegations feel the Code should be mandatory
or legally binding and therefore should take the form of a convention, treaty or other legally
binding agreement. Third Survey, supra, para. 354, at 112. Others feel the Code should be
voluntary and nonmandatory, containing broad principles or guidelines, but not legally
enforceable rules. Id.
2. The Preamble and Objectives: While many delegations feel principles of sovereignty,
noninterference with internal affairs and states' rights to regulate TNC's must be emphasized
in this section, other delegations feel reference to these principles must be balanced by a
reference to international law. Id. para. 357, at 113.
3. Definitions and Scope: The disagreement in this area centers around whether state-
owned enterprises which otherwise fit the definition of TNC's should be considered as being
within the scope of the Code. Id. paras. 360-61, at 113-14.
4. Activities of TNC's: Some delegations insist that all references to host state economic
goals and development objectives be qualified by the term "declared" or "established." Id.
para. 365, at 114-15. Others insist that emphasis be placed on TNC respect for national
sovereignty. Id. para. 364, at 114.
5. Noncollaboration with Racist Minority Regimes: While most delegations feel the
Code should explicitly require TNC's to reduce their business activities in South Africa, others
feel that political issues should be resolved by other UN bodies. Id. paras. 368-69, at 115-16.
6. Implementation: Most delegations favor giving the Commission on Transnational
Corporations the function of interpreting Code provisions in the light of actual situations.
Some delegations are opposed to this proposal, reasoning that it would amount to granting
quasi-judicial powers in the Commission, inappropriate in a voluntary Code. Id. para. 391,
at 121.
7. Treatment of TNC's: Other than the extent of preference or discrimination permissi-
ble, the problems in this area revolve around nationalization and jurisdiction. In regard to
nationalization, some delegations feel adequate compensation should be paid to TNC's and
disputes relating to compensation should be settled in accordance with domestic law. Id.
para. 383, at 119. Others insist on "prompt, adequate and effective compensation," and
dispute resolution according to international law. Id. para. 383, at 119. In regard to jurisdic-
tion, some delegations feel a general statement of the principle that TNC's are subject to the
jurisdiction of the host states should suffice. Id. para. 386, at 120. Others feel it is important
that the language be clarified to avoid the implication that the Code supports concurrent
jurisdiction. Id. para. 386, at 120.
For selected documents and reports of the Commission on Transnational Corporations,
see Transnational Corporations: Certain Modalities for Implementation of a Code of Con-
duct in Relation to its Possible Legal Nature, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.2/9 (1978); Transna-
tional Corporations: Views and Proposals of States on a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/
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transnational corporations, 2 (TNC's), i.e. discriminatory treatment
of transnational corporations by the governments of the states in
which they operate, has been a major area of disagreement in
formulating the Draft Code. 3
19/Add.1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Views and Proposals]; Transnational Corporations:
Views and Proposals of Non-Governmental Interests on a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doe. E/
C. 10/20 (1976); Transnational Corporations: Material Relevant to the Formulation of a Code
of Conduct, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Material Relevant]; Issues
Involved, supra.
2. "Transnational corporation" is the terminology adopted by the UN to refer to com-
mercial enterprises whose operations and activities span national boundaries. C. WALLACE,
supra note 1, at 11.
For a discussion of the distinction between "transnational" and "multinational," see
J. Kuusi, THE HOST STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS 25-26 (1979); C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 10-13; Seidl-Hohenveldern, The
United Nations and Transnational Corporations, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 43, 44-49 (K. Simmonds ed. 1977). The literature on multinational enterprises
generally employs the two terms interchangeably. Charney, Transnational Corporations and
Developing Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 749 n.1 (1983).
Within the scope of this note, three terms will be used to distinguish the standards of
treatment advocated by the three major blocs. "National treatment" is used to refer to the
Developed Country position. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. "Qualified na-
tional treatment" is used to refer to the Lesser Developed Country position. See infra notes
35-44 and accompanying text. The term "exclusively municipal treatment" is used to refer to
the Socialist position. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
3. See Draft Code, supra note 1, paras. 48-50. The paragraphs which relate to national
treatment are presently drafted as follows. Paragraphs and clauses of the Draft Code which
are not agreed upon are designated in italics.
48. Transnational corporations should receive fair and equitable and non-discrimi-
natory treatment under [or] in accordance with the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative practices of the countries in which they operate as well as intergovernmental
obligations to which the Governments of these countries have freely subscribed [or]
consistent with their international obligations [or] consistent with international law.
49. Consistent with national constitutional systems and national needs to protect
essential/national economic interests, maintain public order and to protect national
security, and with due regard to provisions of agreements among countries, particu-
larly developing countries, entities of transnational corporations should be given by
the countries in which they operate the treatment [or] treatment no less favourable
than that [or] appropriate treatment[.] accorded to domestic enterprises under their
laws, regulations and administrative practices when the circumstances in which
they operate are similar/identical [or] in like situations. Transnational corporations
should not claim preferential treatment or the incentives and concessions granted to
domestic enterprises of the countries in which they operate. [or] Such treatment
should not necessarily include extension to entities of transnational corporations of
incentives and concessions granted to domestic enterprises in order to promote self-
reliant development or protect essential economic interests.
50. Endeavouring to assure the clarity and stability of national policies, laws,
regulations and administrative practices is of acknowledged importance. Laws,
regulations and other measures affecting transnational corporations should be pub-
licly and readily available. Changes in them should be made with proper regard to
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Host state treatment of TNC's has been approached differently
by each of the three major political blocs involved in negotiating
the Draft Code. 4 The Developed Countries (DC's), Lesser Devel-
oped Countries (LDC's) and Socialist States have each advocated
standards of treatment consistent with domestic objectives. 5 The
effectiveness of the Code will depend upon which approach to host
state treatment is adopted.
This Note examines the need for guidelines regulating TNC
activity, and the importance of formulating a principle of host state
treatment that will fulfill the objectives of the Draft Code.6 The
three views on host state treatment and the support each view finds
in international law are analyzed.7 From this analysis, it is con-
cluded that only the LDC view, modified to require host states to
clearly state developmental plans, is based on principles that are
recognized by and compatible with the interests of all three blocs.,
I. THE NEED FOR TNC REGULATION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS' RESPONSE
Sharp increases in world trade, capital requirements and the
movement of long-term capital across international boundaries
have accounted for the tremendous growth of many TNC's in the
past twenty-five years.9 Generally, TNC's provide host states with
the legitimate rights and interests of all concerned parties, including transnational
corporations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4. See infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
5. Third Survey, supra note 1, paras. 375-78, at 117-18. The three viewpoints which
have emerged on this issue are typical of the positions generally taken within the UN when
economic issues are discussed. R. HELLMAN, TRANSNATIONAL CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONs 68 (1977). Basically, the DC position is held by the Western industrialized
nations with market oriented economies, within the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development. Id. The LDC position is held by the more than 100 countries of the UN
Group of 77 developing countries, which are at different degrees of economic development.
Id. The Socialist position is held by the Eastern European Socialist countries, which have
centrally planned economies. Id.
The first two blocs have regularly taken opposing stands on issues relating to TNC's. Id.
The Socialist bloc nations generally support the LDC position while at the same time trying
to advance their own ideological positions. Id. This is typical of the division of views in
regard to national treatment. See infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-115 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 116-76 and accompanying text.
9. World Development, supra note 1, at 1. For a discussion of post-1945 growth and
development of TNC's, see J. Kuusi, supra note 2, at 18-24. By the end of the 1960's, two-
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capital, technology and other resources essential for the develop-
ment of domestic industries.' 0 The capacity of TNC's to develop
new technology and skills quickly, and to use their productive and
managerial skills to translate resources into specific output, has
been outstanding."
A TNC's presence, however, often exerts considerable influ-
ence on a host state, both economically12 and socially.13 Economi-
cally, the TNC is able to direct the development of the host state's
natural resources by controlling the capital and technology neces-
sary to develop key industries. 14 By threatening to withdraw this
capital and technology, thereby causing the host state to lose both
development and employment, the TNC can exert powerful eco-
nomic influence. 15 Socially, the presence of the TNC in a nonindus-
thirds of overall direct investment asset value and income flows, and about three-quarters of
the receipts of new capital inflows were accounted for by the DC's. Id. at 20. The remaining
one-third of overall direct investment went to the LDC's, representing nearly 50% of all
private capital movements to these areas. Id.
10. J. Kuusi, supra note 2, at 37. "Dynamic international firms transferred [to LDC's]
by their investments not only urgently needed capital, but technology, know-how and
managerial skills, stimulated local habits of saving and investment and provided training at
different levels." Id. TNC investment can be beneficial to the host state in that it "brings to
those societies most in need of them capital, technology and management and marketing
skills." C.F. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN
INTERESTS 355 (1978) [hereinafter cited as C.F. BERGSTEN].
11. World Development, supra note 1, at 2. "The multinational corporations have
developed distinct advantages which can be put to the service of world development. Their
ability to tap financial, physical and human resources around the world and to combine them
in economically feasible and commercially profitable activities ...have proven to be out-
standing." Id.
12. Gordon, The Impact of the Multinational Corporation in the Third World, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 21, 30-35 (K. Simmonds ed. 1977). The
economic effect of TNC's on host states are usually direct and involve such areas as technol-
ogy transfers, transfer pricing, use of joint ventures, acquisition policies and control of local
credit. Id.
13. See id. at 24-30. "The principal problem for the [LDC] is that the cultural effect of
[TNC'sI is often ancillary to economic activity, and it is therefore more difficult to control
directly than where cultural effect is the primary result of the activities of the [TNC]." Id. at
29.
14. R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 13. Traditionally, the resources of the LDC's have
been "exploited almost exclusively by multinational corporations and [have] served as the
basis of their worldwide business network. . . .The country owning the raw materials had
only limited possibilities to protect its own interests." Id. Another author describes the
dependency which has arisen in terms of "an increase in the influence and power of private
foreign investment and of the [TNC which] has concentrated economic power in the hands of
a few." Parmar, Self-Reliant Development in an "Interdependent" World, in BEYOND DEPEN-
DENCY 3, 10 (G. Erb & V. Kallab ed. 1975). See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
15. Apter, Charters, Cartels and Multinationals-Some Colonial and Imperial Ques-
tions, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 16 (D. Apter & L.
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trialized host state often results in the creation of distorted con-
sumer demands that dramatically affect the cultural and social
foundations of the host state.' 6
LDC's, while recognizing their need for TNC investment, per-
ceive unregulated TNC activity as a subtle threat to sovereignty.'
7
Goodman eds. 1976). Apter states that "so powerful have the multinational corporations
become that effects of [TNC] decision-making jeopardizes the ability of governments to make
decisive national policy. As a predominantly private enterprise . . . it is capable of a great
many alternative strategies and shifting lines of product differentiation." Id. One of the
prime characteristics which enables TNC's to exert economic influence is "its flexibility in
moving funds, material and personnel in and out of countries, all within one organizational
framework with the privacy and speed that it affords." Vagts, The Host Country Faces the
Multinational Enterprise, 53 B.U.L. REv. 261, 265 (1973).
16. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 24-30. "The multinationals' activities in creating
consumer demand in the Third World may lead to distorted consumption patterns by persons
who do not have the education or economic resources to make intelligent choices." Id. at 26.
"[A]dvertising may tend to denigrate local customs .... [T]he issue that local authorities
confront is not so much the particular question of cultural dependency as it is the general
question of whether to protect the local population from certain values of which they
disapprove." C.F. BEIRSTEN, supra note 10, at 367.
17. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 32. TNC's will generally exercise power indirectly
by use of their influence based on the economic impact of their activities, and their personal
political contacts. This is particularly true in the LDC's, where the TNC can rely on
influencing the ruling class to their advantage. Id. at 33. See also World Development, supra
note 1, at 47 ("Often it is not the divergency in explicit objectives but the subtle impact of the
multinational corporation on the process and pattern of development that is the source of
tensions and conflicts.").
There are several reasons why TNC's are able to use this indirect power. Unlike
governments, TNC's are not directly accountable for their policies and actions to a broadly
established electorate. Id. at 2. Unlike national firms, they are not subject to control and
regulation by a single authority which can aim to ensure maximum harmony between their
operations and public interest. Id. Instead, TNC's tend to pursue the interest of their top
management and equitable owners, located in the home state, opting for private objectives of
profit rather than social welfare goals. Id. at 42.
While these problems are not unique to TNC's, they are complicated by the nature of
the TNC.
While conflicts arising out of divergencies between the private objectives of a profit-
making firm and the social welfare goals pursued by a government can apply to
domestic as well as national corporations, there is an important difference in the
capacity of governments to resolve such conflicts. Those of a purely domestic nature
can be settled by the "pouvoir superieur souverain" of the government through its
policies and regulatory machinery. Given the nature of the multinational corpora-
tion, however, conflicts between governments and such corporations assume greater
and more complex proportions.
Id. at 43.
While the supremacy of state sovereignty is recognized, there is a discrepancy between
having this right and having the ability to enforce this right. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5,
at 32. "However sacred and inviolable national sovereignty may be from the political point of
view, few national boundaries correspond to economic demarcation lines and few states are
self-contained economic entities." World Development, supra note 1, at 3.
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They have attempted to monitor TNC activity through domestic
legislation 8 and nationalization.' Legislative attempts to maintain
host state control while promoting TNC investment have generally
failed because TNC's have been able to shift operations to other
developing countries willing to create more favorable investment
climates. 2° Nationalization of a TNC, while giving the LDC control
over the TNC's plant and technology, may result in loss of distribu-
tion and marketing networks necessary for successful operation of
the industry. 21 The consequences of TNC growth and the inability
of individual host states to effectively regulate TNC's, 22 made clear
the need for an international mechanism to regulate TNC operation
while still promoting the developmental aspirations of the host
state. 23
18. For a comparative study of national and regional regulations of TNC's, see National
Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doe. ST/CTC/6
(1978); U.N. Doe. ST/CTC/6/Add.I (1980). The national legislation surveyed displays great
variation in approaches, objectives, comprehensiveness and in the extent of regulation,
control and discrimination to which it subjects foreign direct investment. See U.N. Doc. ST/
CTC/6, at 6 (1978). See infra note 20 and accompanying text (this legislation has not
generally proven effective).
19. More dramatic attempts by host states to regulate TNC activities have taken the
form of host state nationalization of TNC operations. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 14;
C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 249-57; infra note 21 and accompanying text (nationalization
has not proven an optimum solution).
20. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 4. "Because of their economic power and the fact
that they operate simultaneously in several countries, [TNC's] have the possibility to bypass
certain regulations . . . or even to impose their will on political decision makers." Id. States
have continuously had difficulty in drafting legislation which would both promote the
possible benefits of TNC's yet still minimize the negative aspects. Third Survey, supra note 1,
para. 334, at 106. "Host countries could neither threaten nor bargaifi effectively. When one
did attract foreign companies to set up local operations, it was not in a position to place
stringent requirements on corporate behavior." C.F. BERCSTEN, supra note 10, at 371.
21. See Apter, supra note 15, at 24-25. "To nationalize the part of the organization
operating in a particular country is not to nationalize the network. [Extensive nationaliza-
tion] . . . is [a] very awkward [solution] leading to inefficencies, bureaucracy, and a different
set of social overhead costs." Id. at 24. See also R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 14 (disadvan-
tages of nationalization include the loss of the high management, financing and marketing
skills which a TNC provides). If a government tries to subordinate a TNC completely to its
national objectives, it runs the risk of making the enterprise unprofitable, thus changing it
into a burden on the nation's budget. Id. at 30.
22. See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.
23. See World Development, supra note 1, at 43-44. "[N]o single national jurisdiction
can cope adequately with the global phenomenon of the multinational corporation, nor is
there an international authority or machinery adequately equipped to alleviate the tensions
that stem from the relationship between multinational corporations and nation states." Id.
National regulatory regimes are incapable of dealing with all the problems posed by the TNC
unless such regimes are supplemented by international mechanisms. Informal Proposals To
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The CTC was established in 1974 to explore the role of TNC's
in world society and to establish an enforcement mechanism that
would ensure effective accommodation of these concerns on a
world-wide basis .24
Resolve Differences, U.N. CHRON., May 1983, at 65 (opening statement to the Special Session
of the Commission on Transnational Corporations by S. Yolah, UN Undersecretary for
International Economic and Social Affairs).
Beginning in the second half of the 1970's, a variety of international codes of conduct
and guidelines prescribing norms for the TNC's were proposed. Third Survey, supra note 1,
para. 339, at 107. None of these codes is designed to be as universal and comprehensive as the
Draft Code. See infra note 24. For background on the reasons for the proliferation of TNC
guidelines and a discussion of various guidelines, see Vagts, Multinational Corporations and
International Guidelines, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 463, 464-68 (1981). Some of these
instruments are attempts to establish comprehensive frameworks dealing with a wide variety
of issues relating to TNC operations. See, e.g., Int'l Labor Org., Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 423 (1978); Org. of Economic Cooperation and Dev., International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises (1976) [hereinafter cited as OECD Guidelines].
Others are limited to specified subjects or specific regional concerns. See, e.g., The Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980); Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/
25 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 773 (1980); Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on
Corrupt Practices: Corrupt Practices, Particularly Illicit Payments in International Commer-
cial Transactions: Concepts and Issues Related to the Formulation of an International
Agreement, U.N. Doc. E/AC.64/3 (1977); Int'l Chamber of Com., Pub. No. 272, Guidelines
for International Investment (1972) [hereinafter cited as ICC Guidelines].
24. The purposes of the Code are set forth in E.S.C. Res. 1980/60, 67 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. IA) at 18, U.N. Doc. E/1980/80/Add.1 (1980). According to the resolution, the
Code will:
(a) Be effective, comprehensive, generally accepted and universally adopted;
(b) Associate effectively the activities of transnational corporations with efforts to
establish the new international economic order and their capabilities with the
developmental objectives of the developing countries;
(c) Reflect the principle of respect by transnational corporations for the national
sovereignty, laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate, and for the
established policies of those countries and the right of States to regulate and accord-
ingly to monitor the activities of transnational corporations;
(d) Encourage the contribution that transnational corporations can make towards
the achievement of developmental goals and the established objectives of the coun-
tries in which they operate, particularly the developing countries.
Id. para. 6 (emphasis added).
The Code is unique in four ways. First, it is the first code to deal comprehensively with a
wide range of issues associated with the activities of TNC's. The United Nations Code of
Conduct in Transnational Corporations, CTC REP., Summer 1982, U.N. Sales No.E.82.
II.A.14, at 2. Second, it is to be a universal instrument supported by and applicable in all
states. Id. Third, its process of adoption will have taken into account the variety of interests
involved. Id. Lastly, irrespective of its legal nature, it is designed to be effective, inter alia, by
instituting implementation mechanisms for follow up action at both the national and interna-
tional levels. Id.
TNC TREATMENT
II. THE NATURE OF THE HOST STATE
TREA TMENT CONFLICT
As the CTC attempted to formulate a code of conduct, a
controversy arose over provisions on host state treatment of
TNC's. 25 Because of the impact host state treatment has on both
host state economies and TNC operations, the DC's, LDC's and
Socialist States have all found it important to adopt differing views
that reflect their own objectives.26
A. Developed Country Position: National Treatment
In seeking to improve the investment climate in host states, the
DC's maintain that "national treatment" should be given to TNC
operations. 2 The principle of "national treatment" calls for treat-
ment that is "no less favorable" than that given to the host state's
domestic corporations. 28 The DC's recognize that the host state may
require TNC's to observe established entry requirements before
they will be allowed to operate. 2 After operations commence how-
25. See Third Survey, supra note 1, paras. 375-79, at 117-18; Issues Involved, supra
note 1, paras. 134-36, at 31-32; Report on the Second Session, supra note 1, annex. 1, paras.
1, 13; id. annex 2, paras. 2(1), 2(11-13).
26. See infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
27. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 376, at 117-18. National treatment refers gener-
ally to a state's responsibility "to treat the property of aliens in substantially the same manner
in which they treat the property of their own nationals." Fatouros, International Law and
the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783, 807-08 (1964). The principle has varying interpreta-
tions. Id. See Issues Involved, supra note 1, paras. 134-35, at 31-32. "According to one
interpretation, national treatment requires that no alien should be treated better than a
national, but must in all cases be treated the same manner. According to another, it requires
that aliens should not be treated less favorably than nationals." Id. para. 134, at 31-32.
28. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 376, at 117-18. The DC view is drawn primarily
from the OECD Guidelines, supra note 23. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 376, at 117-18.
For the provisions of the OECD Guidelines dealing with national treatment, see infra note 58
and accompanying text.
29. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 23, art. 2(4). For the relevant provision, see infra
note 58 and accompanying text. This right on the part of the host state is generally agreed to
by all parties. The Draft Code provision on this issue reads as follows:
States have the right to regulate the entry and establishment of transnational
corporations including determining the role that such corporations may play in
economic and social development and prohibiting or limiting the extent of their
presence in specific sectors.
Draft Code, supra note 1, para. 47.
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ever, "national treatment" requires the host state to treat it no less
favorably than its national corporations. 30
1. Motivations
Endeavoring to protect their TNC's, the DC's advocate recip-
rocal treatment in international commercial exchange. 31 The prin-
ciple of reciprocal treatment encourages states to enact legislation
generally beneficial to investment. 32 Thus, reciprocal treatment has
traditionally maximized developmental benefits and promoted co-
operation among states. 33 The principle of reciprocity encourages
application of common standards of commercial practice and
thereby promotes the stability in expectations that is necessary to
maximize cooperation between the TNC's and host governments. 34
B. Lesser Developed Country Position:
Qualified National Treatment
The LDC's support a "qualified national treatment" that al-
lows a host state to regulate TNC's in conformity with national
30. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 376, at 117-18. See also OECD Guidelines, supra
note 23, art. 2(1). Under the DC view, the host state at all times remains free to give TNC's
more favorable treatment than its own domestic corporations receive. See Third Survey,
supra note 1, para. 379, at 118; Materials Relevant, supra note 1, para. 246, at 73; Issues
Involved, supra note 1, para. 134, at 31-32.
31. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 74. National treatment among the industrialized
countries is based on the principle of reciprocity. Id. Reciprocity as a basis for national
treatment guarantees security and economic rights to TNC's. See N. FATEMI, G. WILLIAMS &
T. DE SAINT-PHALLE, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 215 (2d ed.
1976). Reciprocity is usually achieved among DC's through treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation. C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 94; see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying
text.
32. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 74.
33. H. STEINER & D. VACTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 626-27 (2d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as H. STEINER]. Reciprocity legislation takes the form of statutes which
provide that "nationals of foreign countries can assert certain rights in this country only if the
foreign country accords the same rights or privileges to United States citizens." Id. The
ultimate aim is frequently to persuade foreign states to change their policies towards the
nationals of the country enacting the reciprocity legislation. Id. at 627.
34. This emphasis on maximization of cooperation was expressed in the United States
response to the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons. "The international community can
play a valuable role in achieving [a legitimate] . . . balance of interests [between govern-
ments and corporations] . . . by promoting understanding between Governments and
multinational corporations which will increase the stability of expectations of each other's
behaviour." The Impact of Transnational Corporations on the Development Process and on
International Relations, U.N. Doe. E/5595/Add.5 para. 1 (1974).
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objectives and priorities. 35 The LDC position makes no reference to
treatment in conformity with international law or in accordance
with "established" objectives.3 6 Therefore, each LDC would be
allowed to determine its own "national priorities and objectives"
and to treat TNC's according to its own sovereign determination
without any threat of outside interference.3 7 "Qualified national
treatment" gives the LDC the freedom to evaluate its situation on a
functional basis, with the option of either preferring or discriminat-
ing against the TNC based on this evaluation. 38
1. Motivations
Since the LDC's are primarily importers of capital, they are
motivated by a desire to ensure the compatibility of TNC activities
with their developmental plans and economic objectives.3 9 The
35. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 378, at 118. The LDC view is primarily drawn
from the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CERDS]. For the
relevent provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), see
infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
36. CERDS, supra note 35, art. 2(a). See also Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at
118. The LDC's have been unwilling to accept the DC assertion that host state treatment of
TNC's should make reference to principles of international law or "established" developmen-
tal plans. Rodriguez-Mendoza, Reflections on the Code: The Negotiations on the United
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Some Issues, CTC REP., Summer
1982, at 9, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.14.
37. See Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118. It has been recognized that
"[p]erhaps the most important element of self-reliance in [LDC's] . . . is the formulation of
concepts and policies of development based on their own socio-economic realities rather than
on ideas inherited from the North." Parmar, supra note 14, at 8. The LDC emphasis on
absolute sovereignty in determining host state actions toward the TNC was apparent from
the onset of Code negotiations when the LDC's expressed opposition to inclusion in the Code
of any principles to be observed by host governments in treatment of TNC's. See Rodriguez-
Mendoza, supra note 36, at 8.
38. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 379, at 118. This is phrased in terms of LDC's
desiring "that the treatment accorded to transnational corporations would not necessarily
include extension to them of incentives given to domestic enterprises." Id. (emphasis added).
The implication is that the host state may prefer or discriminate against the TNC depending
upon its national economic priorities.
39. Third Survey, supra note 1, at 377, at 118. See Report on the Second Session, supra
note 1, annex 1, para 13; id. annex 4, para. F. For instance, the delegations from a group of
South American States insist on economic integration as a basic principle of the Code. "The
[TNC] shall be subject to the national policies, objectives and priorities for development, and
should contribute positively . . . [toward] carrying them out." Id. The LDC's insist on
inclusion of a developmental clause whereby "national treatment would be given to TNC's
only if it is compatible with and does not prejudice the country's economic goals and
development plans." Rodriguez-Mendoza, supra note 36, at 9.
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LDC's take a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach to host
state treatment of TNC's. Their primary concern is with increased
development, not with underlying political or economic philoso-
phy. 40
Since the LDC's generally do not have the technology and
resources possessed by the TNC, 41 the LDC position is that nondis-
criminatory treatment of foreign and domestic enterprises would in
effect amount to discrimination in favor of the TNC. 42 Moreover,
equal treatment of foreign and domestic corporations would en-
courage the short-term benefits provided by foreign capital invest-
ment at the expense of long-term development of host state domes-
tic industries. 43 Thus, adoption of "national treatment," as
advocated by the DC's, would undermine LDC efforts to
strengthen their own enterprises in promotion of autonomous and
self-reliant development. 44
C. Socialist State Position: Exclusively Municipal Treatment
In the view of the Socialist States, states have the right to
regulate TNC's in accordance with their own municipal laws. 45
40. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118; Rodriguez-Mendoza, supra note 36,
at 9.
41. See C.F. BERGSTEN, supra note 10, at 370. The skills of the TNC can be duplicated at
the local level only with great loss in efficiency, if at all. Id.
42. Rodriguez-Mendoza, supra note 36, at 9; see also Third Survey, supra note 1, para.
377, at 118 (citing Rodriguez-Mendoza).
The LDC's feel that the DC reliance on reciprocity is irrelevant to them. R. HELLMAN,
supra note 5, at 74-75; Rodriguez-Mendoza, supra note 36, at 8. See also Goldsmith &
Sonderkotter, Equality and Discrimination in International Economic Law (V), 1975 Y.B.
WORLD AFF. 265, 277. "[R]eciprocity between those who are unequal in economic strength is
a contradiction in economic terms." Id. (quoting S.S. Ramphal, Foreign Minister of Guy-
ana).
43. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118. See also Views and Proposals, supra
note 1, at 7-8; Report on the Second Session, supra note 1, annex 1, para. 13; id. annex 4,
para. 11; D. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONs 66-
67 (1976).
44. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118. See Rodriguez-Mendoza, supra note
36, at 9. The LDC's assert that such "a principle would conflict with efforts being made to
strengthen their own enterprises in order to promote autonomous and self-reliant develop-
ment." Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118.
45. See Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 378, at 118. See also Fatouros, supra note 27,
at 808; Tunkin, The Problem of State Responsibility in the International Law Commission,
1960 SoviET Y.B. INT'L L., 92, 103-04 (English summary); Vitkov, Nationalization and
International Law, 1960 SoviEr Y.B. INT'L L., 58, 78 (English summary); infra notes 102-05
and accompanying text (discussing Socialist reliance on municipal law in regulating TNC's).
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According to this view, equality of treatment should never mean
equal treatment with nationals of the host state.46 In a socialist
state, TNC's enjoy a less privileged status than national corpora-
tions, 47 and are not eligible for the investment incentives granted by
socialist governments to domestic enterprises. 48
1. Motivations
The Socialist view is motivated by a desire to protect the
particular ideological principles underlying their political and eco-
nomic systems. 49 Since the means of production are state-owned in
a socialist state, 50 the Socialist States' "exclusively municipal treat-
ment" formulation is an attempt to effectuate their political ideol-
ogy and economic philosophy. 5' Economic activities of TNC's are
conceivable only within the framework of national planning or in
the context of regional planning by the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (COMECON), and within these frameworks the
interests of the State are always considered supreme.5 2 Therefore,
the Socialist States consider equal treatment of TNC's and state-
owned enterprises to be impermissible. 53
46. Siqueiros, The Juridical Regulation of Transnational Enterprises, in NEw DIREc-
TIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 281, 286-87 (International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law ed. 1977). See also C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 97; Seidl-Hohenveldern,
supra note 2, at 54 (both discussing the implication of the Siqueiros Report). Siqueiros states
that "the most effective legal control of the [transnational enterprise] lies in the local jurisdic-
tion of the investment recipient country." Siqueiros, supra, at 286.
47. See C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 97; Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 2, at 54.
48. See C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 97-98; Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 2, at 54.
"According to Siquerios, 'equality of treatment' should never consist [of] ... equal treatment
with nationals of the host State. Foreigners, especially [TNC's], should enjoy a less privileged
status, but all foreigners ought to be treated alike." Id.
49. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 378, at 118. See Heininger, Negotiations Have
Reached a Crucial Stage, CTC REP., Summer 1982, at 12, 13, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A. 14.
50. Ledyakh & Maltsev, Human Rights in the Present Ideological Struggle, in SOCIAL-
ISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 169, 173 (M. Goncharuk ed. 1979). "By its abolition of private
ownership of the means of production socialism put an end to the ideological worship of the
right of capitalist private property." Id.
51. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
52. R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 76. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) was established in 1949 to coordinate economic cooperation between the
socialist countries. It was set up with a "view to defending ... the People's Democracies
from world imperialism." V.S. SHEvrsov, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SOVIET STATE 156-
57 (1974).
53. See Ledyakh & Maltsev, supra note 50, at 173. "[L]egislation in socialist countries
bars ... any activity that conflicts with the interests of society and the state .... ." Id. The
socialists express the supremacy of the State's interests in terms of a reliance on state sover-
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III. S UPPOR T IN INTERNATIONAL LA W
The three positions on host state treatment of TNC's find
support in differing international instruments, customary practice,
principles of law and ideological considerations.5 4
A. International Legal Support for the Developed
Country Position
The DC position is supported by a number of international
instruments and agreements. 55 In particular, the OECD Guide-
lines56 contain a number of provisions on national treatment that
eliminate discrimination between national and multinational enter-
prises.5 7 The principal article provides:
That Member countries should, consistent with their needs to
maintain public order, to protect their essential security interests
and to fulfill commitments relating to international peace and
security, accord to . .. [Foreign Controlled Enterprises] treat-
ment under their laws ... consistent with international law and
no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domes-
tic enterprises .... 58
To the DC's, the OECD Guidelines reflect the model formulation
of host state treatment for inclusion in the UN Code. 9
eignty. See, e.g., Informal Proposals to Resolve Differences, U.N. CHRON., May 1983, at 66.
The USSR and China both stated in the general debate at the Special Session that the Code
must require strict observance of and respect for host state sovereignty on the part of the
TNC. Id.
54. See infra notes 55-115 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
56. OECD Guidelines, supra note 23.
57. Id. For the primary provisions relating to national treatment, see infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
58. OECD Guidelines, supra note 23, art. 2(1). The OECD Guidelines also provide:
2. [T]hat Member countries will consider applying "National Treatment" in respect
of countries other than Member countries;
3. that Member countries will endeavor to ensure that their territorial subdivisions
apply "National Treatment";
4. that this Declaration does not deal with the right of Member countries to
regulate the entry of foreign investment or the conditions of establishment of foreign
enterprises.
Id. arts. 2(2)-(4). For an analysis of the OECD provisions on national treatment, see Org. of
Economic Cooperation and Dev., National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises
Established in OECD Countries (1978).
59. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 376, at 117-18.
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In addition, a number of articles in the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community" (EEC Treaty) sustain nondis-
criminatory, equal treatment of foreign corporations."' Article 7 of
the EEC Treaty contains a broad anti-discrimination rule prohibit-
ing "any discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 6 2 More
specifically, article 52 of the EEC Treaty calls for "freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of
another Member State. '6 3 The Treaty provides that "freedom of
establishment shall include the right to . . . set up and manage
enterprises and, in particular, companies ... under the conditions
laid down by the law of the country of establishment for its own
nationals."6 4 This grant of "freedom of establishment" ensures for-
eign corporations equal treatment with their domestic counter-
parts, and therefore further supports the DC position. 5
Other legal instruments in which national treatment is ex-
tended are the treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN Treaties).6 The United States, for example, has FCN Trea-
ties with several nations,6 7 and the reciprocal guarantees of national
treatment therein apply with the force of law.68
Typically, the FCN Treaties provide that "companies of either
Contracting Party shall be accorded national treatment with re-
spect to engaging in all types of. . . [business activities] within the
60. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
61. See id. arts. 7, 48(2), 49, 52, 65, 67(1).
62. Id. art. 7. Article 7 states: "Within the field of application of this Treaty and
without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the
grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited." Id.
63. Id. art. 52.
64. id.
65. According to the construction of article 52, "[tlhe right of establishment dealt with
in Article 52 . . . embraces all sectors of economic life: industry, commerce, finance, agricul-
ture, public works, crafts, and the professions." 2 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY § 52.05 (1981).
66. See C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 92.
67. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961,
United States-Belgium, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, July 14, 1956, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter cited as West Germany Treaty]; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965
[hereinafter cited as Italy Treaty].
68. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda. According to the Interna-
tional Law Commission: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B.INT'L
L. COMM'N 177, 180.
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territories of the other Party." 9 National treatment is defined as
"treatment accorded within the territories of a Contracting Party
upon terms no less favourable than the treatment accorded therein,
in like situations, to . . . companies . . . of such Party. '70 Such a
formulation, again, reflects the basic precepts of the DC position.
The DC's also stress the importance of customary international
law. 71 They emphasize that from the earliest international capital
movements, state practice has established a customary rule of inter-
national law guarding the sanctity of private property and protect-
ing property rights of foreigners. 72 In the DC view, equality of
treatment, nondiscrimination and reciprocity have long been a part
of customary international law, 7 and support many of the most
significant treaty relationships in the contemporary world.74 Many
69. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, United States-
Luxembourg, art. VIA, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306 [hereinafter cited as Luxembourg
Treaty). Similar provisions are found in the West Germany Treaty, supra note 67, art. VI,
and the Italy Treaty, supra note 67, art. V(4).
70. Luxembourg Treaty, supra note 69, art. XV.1.
71. The international community has long recognized custom as a primary means of
forming international law. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38 para. 1(b). Where "customary interna-
tional law is built up by the common practice of States . . . it is probably true to say that
consent is latent in the mutual tolerations that allow the practice to be built up at all; and
actually patent in the eventual acceptance (even if tacit) of the practice, as constituting a
binding rule of law." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 68. The
United States has recognized customary international law as part of its municipal law
administerable by United States courts. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
72. J. Kuusi, supra note 2, at 36. "As private capital movements abroad increased
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, a rule of international law for the protection
of the property rights of aliens. . . was gradually established." Id. This standard is still viable
today, and justified, in the DC view, in that it promotes movements of capital to LDC's,
which are urgently in need of external capital. Id. at 37.
73. See J. Kuusi, supra note 2, at 36; Fatouras, supra note 27, at 807. "Part of the
classical approach of international law, including protection of property, is nondiscrimina-
tion, which is sometimes described as a requirement . . . for 'national treatment' .... ' D.
WALLACE, supra note 43, at 112. According to the DC's, "[niondiscrimination should be a
basic rule." Id. To permit discrimination, even when the reasons are appealing, encroaches
on an open economic system. Id. at 114.
74. H. STEINER, supra note 33, at 627. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges
in Certain Areas Off Their Coasts, Apr. 24, 1970, United States-Canada, 21 U.S.T. 1283,
T.I.A.S. No. 6879 (fisheries convention); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 15, 1963, 14
U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (nuclear test ban treaty); West Germany
treaty, supra note 67.
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DC theorists view reciprocity as a consideration that is fundamental
to DC political and legal action.7 5
Looking to municipal law, the DC's draw upon equality of
treatment and reciprocity as general principles of law common to
all civilized nations. 76 According to the DC's, the widespread ac-
ceptance of these principles supports the conclusion that both have
become general principles of international law. 77 For example, the
Company laws of a number of states prohibit corporate discrimina-
tion against foreign shareholders. 78 The United States, in particu-
lar, accords national treatment to all foreign enterprises, giving
them the same legal standing as their domestic counterparts. 79 The
United States Trade Act of 1974,80 in promotion of "the develop-
ment of an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair world economic
system,' 8' contains provisions relating to both nondiscriminatory2
and reciprocal treatment . 3 Among the purposes of this Act are "to
strengthen economic relations between the [United States] and for-
eign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade
[and] to establish fairness and equity in international trade rela-
75. See H. STEINER, supra note 33, at 627-28. Steiner and Vagts explain this underlying
reliance:
For many contemporary theorists of international law and relations . . . reciprocity
and the related concepts of accommodation and comity form the very cornerstone of
the subject matter. Forbearance by a nation from exertion of its full power in an
effort to encourage others to a comparable attitude of restraint, the principle that
one should do to others as one would have done to oneself, are fundamental
considerations in many areas of political and legal action.
Id.
76. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
77. See C. DE VIsscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 280
(1968). The principles by which a nation regulates the property rights of aliens are interna-
tional law principles. Id. "The treatment due to the alien corresponds to an international
standard or common level adopted in civilized countries. ... Id. at n.85.
78. C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 92. For instance, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
France, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Austria and Israel all have company laws
prohibiting corporate discrimination against foreign shareholders. Schmitthoff, The Multina-
tional Enterprise in the United Kingdom, in NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE 22, 26 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith & R. Wright eds. 1973). See C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at
92.
79. C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 92.
80. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
81. H.R. REP. No. 10,710, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7186.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 2434 (1976).
83. Id. § 2136.
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tions. ' '8 4 Equality of treatment and reciprocity thus being integral
to DC treaty, custom and municipal law, support the DC position
that national treatment of TNC's is required.
B. International Legal Support for the Lesser
Developed Country Position
The LDC's have not agreed to any international legal instru-
ment that embodies the principle of national treatment as formu-
lated by the DC's.8 5 While the LDC's generally recognize that
unreasonable and discriminatory measures should be avoided, this
recognition is qualified.86 The host government may discriminate
by according "special treatment to any enterprise or enterprises,
whether domestic or foreign owned, in the interest of the econ-
omy. "87
The LDC position finds support in the UN Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States8 (CERDS). Article 2 of CERDS
grants each state the right "[t]o regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance
with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national
objectives and priorities. 89 This formulation, making specific refer-
84. Id. § 2102 (emphasis added).
85. Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 377, at 118.
86. Id. para. 378, at 118. The LDC's have "insisted that the various proposed provisions
on national treatment should be qualified by terms taking into account their peculiar
developmental concerns." Id. While national treatment is recognized by the LDC's, they seek
a "clause whereby national treatment would be given to transnational corporations only if
compatible with and not prejudicial to the country's economic goals and development plans."
Id.
87. ICC Guidelines, supra note 23, art. 1.3.d. This formulation of permissible host state
conduct by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) reflects the ICC's belief that "if
international investment is to make its optimum contribution to economic and social progress
alongside a strong and efficient domestic private sector, it is essential that mutual understand-
ing between private international investors and governments on basic issues affecting their
relationship be promoted." Id. at 6-7.
88. CERDS, supra note 35. CERDS was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974
for the fundamental purpose of promoting "the establishment of the new international
economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and
co-operation among all States." [1974] U.N.Y.B. 383, U.N. Sales No. E.76.1.1. For an
analysis of CERDS, see Laing, International Economic Law and Public Order in the Age of
Equality, 12 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1980); Note, Charter on Economic Rights and
Duties of States. A Solution to the Development Aid Problem?, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
441 (1974).
89. CERDS, supra note 35, art. 2.
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ence to national objectives and priorities, reflects the position on
host state treatment that the LDC's wish to include in the UN
Code. 0 In addition, the UN Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order9' (DENIEO) and the Lom6
Convention of the European Community92 contain similar conces-
sions of nonreciprocal, preferential treatment for domestic corpora-
tions in LDC's.9 3 For instance, one of the principles on which
DENIEO is founded is full respect for "[p]referential and nonrecip-
rocal treatment for developing countries, wherever feasible, in all
fields of international economic cooperation." 9 The LDC's "quali-
fied national treatment" thus recognizes the desire of the LDC's to
regulate TNC's when harmful to developmental aspirations, while
reserving the right to grant preferential treatment to TNC's when
desirable for economic development. 5
The LDC's maintain that the controlling general principle of
international law is a state's right to safeguard its own interests. 96
This principle encompasses the right to exercise exclusive sover-
eignty over natural resources9 7 and to preserve national economic
90. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
91. The UN New International Economic Order was established by G.A. Res. 3201, S-6
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). Its purpose was to correct
inequalities, redress existing injustices, eliminate the gap between developed and developing
countries and ensure economic and social development. [1974] U.N.Y.B. 306, U.N. Sales No.
E.76.I.1. For an analysis of the impact of the establishment of the New International
Economic Order, see Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16
J. WORLD TRADE L. 338 (1982).
92. Lom6 Convention, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975). In force as of April 1, 1976,
the Lom6 Convention was signed by 66 states. Forty-six were the original African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) countries, 11 were new ACP members and nine were the members of the
European Economic Community. E. FREY-WouTERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
THIRD WORLD: THE LOMt CONVENTION AND ITS IMPACT 1 (1980). The Lom6 Convention
establishes a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible
with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and balanced
economic order. Lom6 Convention, supra, tit. I, art. 1.
93. See Lom6 Convention, supra note 92, tit. I, chap. 1, art. 7. "In view of their present
developmental needs, the ACP States shall not be required .. . to assume .. .obligations
corresponding to the commitments entered into by the Community in respect of imports of
the products originating in the ACP States. ... Id.
94. G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) art. 4(n), at 4, U.N. Doe. A/9559
(1974).
95. Material Relevant, supra note 1, para. 253, at 75.
96. R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 29. The principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources is generally recognized by the international community. See infra note 144
and accompanying text.
97. World Development, supra note 1, at 46.
19841
486 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:467
independence.18 While these principles are essential to every state,
they are of particular importance to the LDC's. In view of their
relative political and economic immaturity, promotion of sover-
eignty and economic independence is seen as essential to their devel-
opment."" In the LDC view, these principles should override any
considerations of national treatment. 10
0
C. International Legal Support for the Socialist States' Position
The Socialist position does not rely on international law be-
cause Socialist States have not agreed to an international instrument
recognizing any policy on host state treatment. 0 1 They advocate
"exclusively municipal treatment," contending that the nature of
property relations within a state are strictly the province of the
domestic government and not international law. 0 2 Intervention by
international bodies in the state's domestic affairs is not, and never
has been, recognized by international law.103 Because municipal
98. R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 29.
99. J. Kuusi, supra note 2, at 28. "Sovereignty and the dignity of statehood are cher-
ished by the newly independent countries and transnationals when exercising their influence
in these countries may be regarded as agents of neo-colonialism." Id. Host states have come to
realize that their right of state sovereignty gives them an exclusive right to develop their
resources to their own advantage. See T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE 153-224 (1974). This awakening has been described in terms of a
host country "learning curve." Id. at 162-69. As the host country becomes more adept at
dealing with the TNC's, "the rhetorical dream of 'recovering control of the natural wealth'
and 'restoring sovereignty over national development' comes at last within reach." Id. at 167.
100. See upra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
101. The international instrument containing the position closest to the Socialist view is
the Andean Foreign Investment Code, Ancom Decision, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977).
The Declaration to this Code states: "The treatment given to foreign capital may not
discriminate against national investors." Id. para. 4. "Member Countries shall not grant to
foreign investors any treatment more favorable than that granted to national investors." Id.
para. 50.
The Andean Foreign Investment Code was prepared by the Andean Group, which
consists of five Latin American countries. H. STEINER, supra note 33, at 455. For a discussion
of this Code, see Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign
Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 313 (1972); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment
Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972).
102. Vitkov, supra note 45, at 78. "International law does not consider the nature of
property rights nor does it regulate property relations within a state." Id. Consequently, the
Socialists feel that any determinations of the property rights of aliens, namely the operations
of a TNC, should not be subject to inquiry by international law. See id. See also Third
Survey, supra note 1, para. 378, at 118.
103. Vitkov, supra note 45, at 78. The Soviets feel that determinations of aliens'
property rights "cannot become a subject for discussion by another state." Id.
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law regulates all matters connected with the acquisition, transfer or
loss of ownership rights, the Socialist States contend that this issue
should be resolved exclusively according to the municipal laws of
each state. 104
The implication of the Socialist position is clearly that host
governments may discriminate. 10 5 Municipal law espouses princi-
ples that subject foreign property to local laws, regulations and
orders. 06 "Since no general statement as to 'equality of treatment'
or nondiscrimination is included in these principles, the 'local laws,
regulations and orders' may well be directed solely against aliens or
against a single category of aliens."'0 7
The Socialist States' position is supported by their political and
economic ideology. 108 By definition, industry and means of produc-
tion are state-owned in a socialist society and represent the interests
of all citizens of the state. 109 Promotion of state-owned enterprises is
essential in furthering the interests of the state and its citizens." 0
This strong reliance on ideology permits the Socialist States to
refute national treatment as a principle of international law."'
Like the LDC's, the Socialist States deny that any custom of inter-
national law has developed from the practice of the DC's. 112
104. Id. "Under international law states are sovereign, therefore only municipal and not
international law can regulate all matters connected with the acquisition, transfer and loss of
ownership rights. ... Id.
105. Fatouros, supra note 27, at 808. The Soviet doctrine of equality of treatment "is
understood in a negative rather than a positive sense. That is to say, while 'foreigners cannot
enjoy greater rights than the citizens of the country concerned,' they may enjoy less." Id.
(quoting Yevgenyev, The Subject o1 International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 132
(Kozhevnikov ed. 1957)).
106. Fatouros, supra note 27, at 809.
107. Id.
108. See Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 378, at 118. See also supra notes 45-53 and
accompanying text (discussing motivations for the Socialist States' position).
109. See J. HILDEBRAND, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SoviET LAW 19, 43 (1972); Patyulin, State
and Individual: Constitutional Principles of Relationship, in SOCIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
56, 57-58 (M. Goncharuk ed. 1979). "[T]he relationship between the state of the whole
people and its citizens (socio-economic and cultural rights, political rights and freedoms, and
personal freedoms) . . . reflect the actual status of the individual in Soviet society . I.. ." ld.
110. See Kuritsyn, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, in SOCIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
29, 40 (M. Goncharuk ed. 1979). Essential to assuring the individuals rights and freedoms is
"the fundamental transformation of the economy, the establishment of public, socialist
ownership of the main means of production." Id. at 34; Patyulin, supra note 109, at 62-63.
111. See Tunkin, supra note 45, at 102-03.
112. Tunkin, Coexistence and International Law, [1958] 3 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 21-23.
The basis of customary international law is agreement between states on the particular
practice. See Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commis-
sion, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/16, para. 11 (1950) (working paper prepared by M. Hudson)
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Rather, the Socialist States contend that formulations of interna-
tional law developed by the DC's primarily to protect their own
interests, have no application in present day international law or in
host state regulation of TNC's. 113 They maintain that the practice of
equality of rights between nationals and aliens developed as a
reaction to the privileged status enjoyed by aliens in colonial and
dependent countries and, therefore has no relevance in modern
economic exchange. 1 4 In the Socialist view, the doctrine of na-
tional treatment was never a generally recognized principle of in-
ternational law. 115
IV. ANALYSIS
A. General Principles of Law Must Be Relied Upon in Formulating
a Provision on Host State Treatment For the Code
The UN Code of Conduct must look to the sources of interna-
tional law in formulating a position on host state treatment of
TNC's which will be recognized by all parties as legitimate and
authoritative."" The principal sources of international law are
[hereinafter cited as Hudson]. Socialists contend that there is no such agreed practice of
national treatment. See Tunkin, supra note 45, at 102.
Custom must arise through the agreement and practice of states with differing political
systems and ideological backgrounds. See C. DE VIsscHER, supra note 77, at 161. "What gives
international custom its special value . . . is the fact that, developing by spontaneous prac-
tice, it reflects a deeply felt community of law." Id. National treatment does not have this
broad quality. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
113. Tunkin, supra note 45, at 101. National treatment, in the Socialist view, reflects
"the desire of the rulers of the main capitalist Powers to take advantage of international law
to protect their foreign investments and the privileges enjoyed by their nationals." Id.
114. Id. at 102-03. The Socialists feel equality between the rights of aliens and nationals
"is colonial in nature. Imperialist states, citing this doctrine which they themselves created,
demanded a privileged status for their nationals and property abroad." Id.
115. Id. at 103. According to the Socialist States', the DC view would conflict with the
purposes of present day international law. Id. at 101. Tunkin, a leading Soviet jurist on
international law, expresses the main purposes and principles of international law as being
"principles of respect for state sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, equality of
states, [and] good neighborly fulfillment of international obligations." G.I. TUN IN, THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1974).
116. Article 13 of the UN Charter recognizes the importance of UN action in "encourag-
ing the progressive development of international law and its codification." U.N. CHARTER art.
13. While General Assembly action is not legally binding, "particular declarations express
agreed law based either on the Charter or on general international law" and are generally
drawn from and consistent with international law. Schachter, The Evolving International
Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4 (1976). For a discussion of the UN
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treaty, custom and generally recognized principles of municipal
law. 117
Because there is no legal instrument of universal scope in
which host state treatment of TNC's is universally prescribed, trea-
ties are not a useful source in formulating a universal principle. 11
LDC instruments that espouse national treatment of TNC's usually
qualify the principle of equality inherent in national treatment to
the extent that it is no longer a useful standard.119 Even in DC
instruments that espouse unreserved application of national treat-
ment, qualifications, such as protocols to FCN Treaties, often con-
stitute "significant curtailment[s], if not de facto denial[s], of the
principle which the treaty has otherwise sought to achieve."' 120
Custom does not prove to be a useful source in this instance
because international law requires consistent practice, across the
political spectrum, in establishing a rule of customary international
law.' 21 Neither the LDC's nor the Socialist States practice unre-
Charter as a source of international law in the context of self-determination, see Note,
Territorial Claims as a Limitation to the Right of Self-Determination in the Context of the
Falkland Islands Dispute, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 443, 446-54 (1983).
117. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38. Article 38 reads, in pertinent part:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Id.
118. Issues Involved, supra note 1, para. 135, at 32. "There seems to be no international
legal instrument of more or less universal scope in which the principle of national treatment is
prescribed." Id. See supra notes 55-75, 87-95, 101-02 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. While all parties agree to a qualifi-
cation of national treatment in the interests of public order and protection of national
security, other overriding qualifications include references to national constitutional systems,
national economic interests or provisions of international agreements. Third Survey, supra
note 1, para. 379, at 118.
120. C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 93. For example, in the Luxembourg Treaty, supra
note 69, Luxembourg reserves to itself the privilege of rejecting United States citizens seeking
"to exercise gainful activities" unless "appropriate authorizations for access to and exercise of
such activities have been granted." Id. protocol, para. 4. Such a qualification undermines the
grant of national treatment established in the Luxembourg Treaty and can be construed as
compromising the spirit of the treaty. C. WALLACE, supra note 1, at 93.
121. See Hudson, supra note 112, para. 11. Among the elements required for the
emergence of a rule of customary international law are: "(a) concordant practice by a
number of States with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of interna-
tional relations; (b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time." Id.
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served application of national treatment, therefore, the requisite
practice is not established. Even if national treatment is considered
a custom of international law established through the practice of
the DC's, both the LDC's and the Socialist States refuse to be bound
by a custom of international law which their practice did not help
formulate. 122
Therefore, the basis on which to assess the international legal-
ity of each position on host state treatment of TNC's must be
general principles of law common to the various blocs.12 3 To be
recognized as bonafide under international law, the principles
should fulfill two criteria. First, the principles should be in con-
formity with the purposes of international law in the area of TNC
regulation. 12 4 International law emphasizes dual purposes in regard
to TNC regulation. The emphasis is placed on optimum develop-
ment of world resources, consistent with maximum benefits to the
region where the resources are located. 12 5 Second, the principles
should be broadly recognized as legitimate and should be compati-
ble with differing state systems.12 6
122. R.P. ANAND, NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-64 (1972). The LDC's
frequently observe that customary international law was created mainly by European states
and their North American offshoots. Id. Much of this law, in their view, was meant to serve
the limited interests of the European states and not the interests of the rest of the world. Id.
123. "Where neither international convention nor accepted custom ... furnishes a
satisfactory rule of law, the law must be deduced from the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 106 (1958).
124. See Fatouros, supra note 27, at 809-10. When there is an irreconcilable conflict
among points of view, it is necessary to look at the objectives sought by the international law
rules in the field. Id. at 809. The conformance of a principle of international law and the
necessity of adaptation of principles to changing world order is essential to effective interna-
tional legal standards. C. JENKS, supra note 123, at 412-15. "It has been, and is likely to
remain, even more true of international law than of the common law that the 'felt necessities
of the time. . . have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.' " Id. at 413 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
1 (1881)).
125. Fatouros, supra note 27, at 810. UN General Assembly Resolutions have repeatedly
placed a double emphasis on "international cooperation for the economic development of
developing countries" and on "economic independence" and "permanent sovereignty over
natural resources." See infra note 144.
126. See Hudson, supra note 112, para. 11; Kartashkin, International Regulation of
Fundamental Human Rights, in SOCIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153, 157-58 (M. Goncharuk
ed. 1979). The legitimacy of a law within a particular legal system depends upon the
underlying ideology and political philosophy of the social system. J. HILDEBA ND, supra note
109, at 35. "If any real meaning is to be given to the words 'general' or 'universal' . . . the
correct test would seem to be that ...before taking over a principle from private law [it
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B. Only the LDC Position Meets the Dual Criteria of a
Bonafide Principle of International Law
1. First Criterion: Conformity with the Purposes of
International Law
The LDC position on host state treatment of TNC's is the only
position that meets the first criterion of a bonafide general principle
of international law.12 7 It strikes an appropriate balance of both
enhancing benefits to the resource-holder and promoting develop-
ment of world resources. 2 8 The LDC position enhances benefits to
the host state in that it permits the host government to tailor its
treatment of the TNC, through either preference or discrimination,
in order to best promote host state economic priorities. 29 Because
the LDC position permits host states to grant preferential treatment
to TNC's, it also promotes the development of world resources.
Host states will still encourage TNC investment and the superior
capabilities of the TNC in developing resources will still be utilized
to promote optimum world development. 130
Neither the Socialist nor the DC position would fulfill this first
criteria. Adoption of the DC position would maximize TNC invest-
ment and thereby encourage optimum development of world re-
sources. However, the DC position would minimize the benefits to
the host state in that host states would not be permitted to adapt
their treatment of TNC's to best suit their economic priorities.13 1
must be] recognized in substance by all the main systems of law, and that [the principle] will
not be doing violence to the fundamental concepts of any of those systems." H. GurDcE,
COMPARATE LAW 65 (1946).
127. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
128. See Fatouros, supra note 27, at 804. The LDC position reflects both a desire "to
develop their economies in order to provide a higher standard of living for their people" and a
recognition that only through cooperation with the TNC will the means to develop their
resources be provided. Id.
129. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. As has been emphasized, the LDC's
continuously stress conformance with their economic objectives, placing the exact nature of
the treatment given secondary to this paramount objective. Id.
130. There is little question that TNC's represent the most efficient means of developing
world resources. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. The LDC's recognize this, as
well as that encouraging TNC investment can promote benefits to their state. Fatouros, supra
note 27, at 804.
131. See Fatouros, supra note 27, at 810. The DC view "would encourage the invest-
ment of Western private capital in the developing countries, and thus promote the develop-
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The Socialist view would promote the interests of the host state at
the expense of discouraging TNC investment. It would therefore
discourage the optimum development of world resources which
TNC investment brings. 132
Therefore, the balance struck by the LDC position is best
suited to accomplish the purposes of international law in the area of
TNC regulation. It is also best suited to accomplish the purposes of
the UN Code of Conduct. The LDC position recognizes the TNC's
responsibility to integrate its activities into the developmental ob-
jectives of the host state.133 The LDC view "[r]eflect[s] the principle
of respect by transnational corporations for national sovereignty,
laws and regulations" of the host state.134 Yet it still "[e]ncourage[s]
the contribution that transnational corporations can make towards
the achievement of developmental goals and the established objec-
tives of the [host state].' '135
2. Second Criterion: Broadly Recognized and Compatible
In assessing the three positions in terms of the second criterion,
it is apparent that only the LDC position is based on principles
which are both broadly recognized and compatible with all three
systems. 13
a. Broadly Recognized
While both the DC and Socialist positions are rational bypro-
ducts of the political, economic and social systems of each bloc,
neither the principles relied upon by the DC's nor the Socialists are
broadly recognized by the other blocs. 37 The DC's assert that
freedom to own property is an essential part of economic freedom
ment of their natural resources. At the same time. . . it limits the freedom of these countries
to take the measures they may later deem necessary for their economic development." Id.
132. See id. The Socialist view "would give the host countries greater flexibility, but it
would provide too little security and certainty to the prospective foreign investors." Id.
133. See E.S.C. Res. 1980/60, supra note 24, para. 6(b). This integration is inherent in
conformance with developmental plans and objectives. See supra notes 12-21 and accompa-
nying text.
134. E.S.C. Res. 1980/60, supra note 24, para. 6(c).
135. Id. para. 6(d).
136. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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and that restrictions on economic freedom inevitably affect free-
dom in general. 138 It is therefore crucial to the DC's to secure
"national treatment" of TNC's, thereby preventing discriminatory
restrictions on TNC activities.1 3  The Socialist States, however,
maintain that state ownership of the means of production and
promotion of state interests are the means of guaranteeing freedom
of the individual. 140 This justifies their view that treatment of
TNC's must be discriminatory. 141 Each position is founded in a
political and economic philosophy that is neither recognized by, nor
compatible with the political and economic philosophy of the
other. 142
The principles underlying the LDC view, however, are
broadly recognized by all three blocs. "Qualified national treat-
ment," is thus compatible with both the DC and the Socialist
systems.1 43 The principles of state sovereignty and economic inde-
pendence are fundamental precepts of international law and have
been recognized and affirmed repeatedly in UN resolutions.1 4  All
three blocs recognize both these principles as being inherent in
effective international relations.145
138. See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 67 (1980); A GUTMAN, LIBERAL
EQUALITY 37-40 (1980).
139. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
140. See Kuritsyn, supra note 110, at 35. "Concentration of the basic means of produc-
tion in the hands of the state provided it with the opportunity not only of proclaiming the
individual's rights and freedoms, but of assuring them materially, politically and organisa-
tionally." Id.
141. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
142. See Ledyakh & Maltsev, supra note 50, at 169. Socialism and capitalism are
diametrically opposed social systems. Socialism reconstructs the social order so as to disregard
all existing principles of a capitalist regime. Id.; J. HILDEBRAND, supra note 109, at 36.
143. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
144. World Development, supra note 1, at 46. For UN resolutions which affirm a state's
right to sovereignty and economic independence, see, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); G.A. Res. 3016, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48, U.N.
Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2692, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); GA. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966); G.A.
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1515,
15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 20) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
145. See World Development, supra note 1, at 46. "The principle of permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources [is] generally accepted by the international community .... "
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b. Compatible with All Systems
The LDC view is potentially compatible with the Socialist and
DC systems. The LDC view accommodates the Socialist concern
with guarding their political and social systems from capitalist
influence because, in practice, implementation of the LDC and
Socialist positions would produce similar results. 146 Whether the
standard is treatment in accordance with a state's self-determined
and amorphous developmental goals or in accordance with a state's
municipal law, the host government still retains the ability to treat
TNC's solely according to its domestic objectives. Socialist States
will be free to formulate their national objectives so as to maintain
the control over TNC's that is compatible with their political and
economic infrastructures.
Accommodation of the concerns of the DC's, which are pri-
marily manifested by the TNC's concerns, is not as easily accom-
plished. The TNC's concern with being subject to host developmen-
tal plans and objectives is that often the host state fails or refuses to
make these plans clearly known, or changes these plans abruptly.1 47
The TNC's seek reliable criteria to use in making investment deci-
sions and a degree of certainty of investment after these decisions
are made.1 48 They fear that nationalization by the host state, which
has often resulted from abrupt changes in developmental plans,
will cause loss of their investment and capital. 49
Id. Sovereignty is considered a fundamental attribute of a state, vital to the unfolding of
interstate relations. G. ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 9
(1979).
146. See Fatouros, supra note 27, at 808. The Socialist position is not always clearly
distinguishable from the LDC position. Id. The primary difference lies in the Socialists'
emphasis on advancing their own ideological position. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 68.
147. See Issues Involved, supra note 1, para. 73, at 20. "[Clases in which relationships
between multinational corporations and host Governments have deteriorated sharply over
time are often those in which clarity was lacking in host country policies. ... Impact,
supra note 1, at 40.
148. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 35. TNC's generally endeavor to avoid conflicts
and try to create a friendly atmosphere of cooperation with the host state. It is not in their
interest to get involved in political confrontations. They are, by nature, profit-oriented
organizations. Id.; Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's
Analysis, 3 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 8 (1971).
149. For an analysis of Chilean nationalization of copper and its effect on Anaconda
and Kennecott, two TNC's operating in Chile, see T. MORAN, supra note 99, at 119-52.
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The means of accommodating these concerns on the part of the
TNC are, however, already within the provisions of the Draft
Code. Paragraph 50 of the Draft Code provides:
Endeavouring to assure the clarity and stability of national poli-
cies, laws, regulations and administrative practices is of ac-
knowledged importance. Laws, regulations and other measures
affecting transnational corporations should be publicly and
readily available. Changes in them should be made with proper
regard to the legitimate rights and interests of all concerned
parties, including transnational corporations. 50
Adoption of Paragraph 50 would effectively require host states to
clearly state and implement their developmental plans and objec-
tives. Such a requirement would thereby provide the TNC with
adequate information on which to base its investment decisions. 15'
In addition, adoption of paragraph 50 would require governmental
measures affecting TNC's to be clarified and publicly available to
the TNC. 52 Finally it would require changes in regulations to be
made with regard to the rights and interests of TNC's.153 Thus, the
150. Draft Code, supra note 1, para. 50. The paragraph is one of several fully disputed
paragraphs proposed by the DC's to specifically accommodate their concerns with the LDC
position. See Third Survey, supra note 1, para. 373, at 117.
151. Requiring host state policies to be clearly established has been advocated by a
number of authorities. In evaluating this proposal, the Group of Eminent Persons stated:
"When [national] plan objectives are clearly stated and concrete measures are put into effect,
multinational corporations may in fact be responsive to them." World Development, supra
note 1, at 47. See R. HELLMAN, supra note 5, at 35; D. WALLACE, supra note 43, at 75.
152. Draft Code, supra note 1, para 50.
153. Id. In order for this clause of paragraph 50 to have any substantive meaning for the
TNC, there must be an international recognition that TNC's have "legitimate rights and
interests" which must be regarded. The implication of the paragraph is that such a recogni-
tion will be afforded. C]. id. However, since the content of these rights and interests goes to
the core of the guarantee of certainty which the clause endeavors to grant, it is crucial that
these rights be clarified.
These rights are granted to the TNC through the substantive provisions of the Code
dictating host state treatment of TNC's and the DC's have indicated clearly that the Code
will not be acceptable to them unless such provisions are included. Rubin, For a Balanced
Code, CTC Rep., Summer 1982, at 11, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.14. Included in the rights
the Code grants or potentially grants to TNC's are: the right to good faith negotiations and
implementation of contracts with host governments, Draft Code, supra note 1, para. 11; the
right to safeguards and confidentiality in disclosure of business information to the host
government, id. para. 51; the right to unrestricted transfer of personnel between entities of
the TNC, id. para. 52; the right to unrestricted transfer of income from invested capital and
repatriation of capital on termination of investment, id. para. 53.
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adoption of paragraph 50 would allow host states to retain the right
to regulate TNC's in accordance with developmental objectives,
while still assuring the TNC a degree of certainty in investment
planning. 154
C. Effective Implementation Will Require Host States to Take
Additional Measures in Conjunction with Adoption of the Code.
The adoption of paragraph 50 could raise concerns on the part
of the LDC's. In order to strengthen the stated developmental plans
required by adoption of paragraph 50, and protect themselves
against abuse of such a policy by the TNC, host states, in conjunc-
tion with adoption of the Code of Conduct, should take concerted
action to yield an organized system of development. 155
Traditionally, host states have encouraged foreign direct in-
vestment by offering generous incentives to attract TNC's. 156 This
practice often led to host states bidding against each other for TNC
investment. 157 The problem with adoption of paragraph 50 is that it
effectively requires the host state to adhere to the terms initially
agreed upon with the TNC.15 It is foreseeable that the host states,
in efforts to attract the TNC's, will formulate developmental plans
with terms highly favorable to TNC's, and then by virtue of the
Code provision, be required to adhere to them to their own detri-
ment. 159
Though still a major source of debate itself at this point in negotiations, paragraph 54 of
the Draft Code could provide the TNC with a valuable right to full compensation in the
event of host state nationalization. While the nature of the disagreement is beyond the scope
of this Note, it will suffice to say that any provision adopted that makes reference to
international law standards and fair market value compensation, would provide TNC's with
a valuable safeguard against arbitrary host state action. See id. para. 54.
154. 'See Issues Involved, supra note 1, para. 73, at 20. TNC adherence to clearly
enunciated objectives "would enhance the integration of TNC activities in the host country's
economy and promote greater harmony in the relations between TNC's and Governments."
Id.
155. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
156. World Development, supra note 1, at 44.
157. Id. See Apter, supra note 15, at 5. In encouraging TNC investment, LDC's "tend
to offer special conditions to attract multinationals, ensure them high return on investments,
favorable and controlled supply of labor, tax rebates, and other fiscal advantages." Id. at 27.
See also D. WALLACE, supra note 43, at 74.
158. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
159. See D. WALLACE, supra note 43, at 74-75. The problem arises because "[n]ations
are not usually prepared to accept an optimal allocation of resources if they can obtain more
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To solve this problem, international organizations among
holders of similar resources should be formed to prescribe uniform
standards for formulating developmental plans. 160 Formation of
international organizations would reduce the ability of TNC's to
use disparity in host state developmental objectives to their advan-
tage at the expense of the resource-holding states.'16
The formation of international organizations would enable
host states offering the same resources to TNC's to present a unified
front and not be harmed by bidding against each other for TNC
investment.162 Such international organizations can be a fundamen-
tal way for the LDC's to protect their sovereignty and enhance their
economic independence. 63 International organizations set up to
defend the interest of raw material producing countries emphasize
the necessity of strengthening host state economic independence
and defending the host state's right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. 164 Rather than sacrificing any degree of sover-
eignty and economic independence, cooperation among like re-
source-holders will lead to maximum long-term benefits to all par-
ties.' 65  The community of interests inherent in similar
for themselves instead." Id. at 62-63. Paragraph 50 has the potential to bind the states
competing for TNC investment into highly detrimental terms of agreement with the TNC.
160. A resource grouping would be the most effective way of combatting the problem of
bidding wars. See supra notes 157-59. Grouping by stage of development would be too
subjective and amorphous. Grouping by region, which would correspond with resource
groupings in many situations, seems a less direct way of confronting the problem to be
resolved. See G. ELIAN, supra note 145, at 76-77.
161. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
162. The effect of such agreements would be to increase the bargaining power of the
LDC vis-a-vis the TNC. "The greater the power of the host country in relation to the
multinational corporation and the more independent its leading class is from their influence,
the better both sides will be able to accomplish their respective tasks. Force and adequate
counterforce are the best guarantees for a well-balanced relationship." R. HELLMAN, supra
note 5, at 36. When governments harmonize their policies, they present a united front against
a TNC deciding which country to invest in and thereby eliminate the "bidding wars" which
generally serve to benefit only the TNC. Apter, supra note 15, at 2-3.
163. See G. ELIAN, supra note 145, at 76.
164. Id. "Such associations 'represent a response to the improper and disproportionate
power of the multinational corporations.' " Id. (quoting statement by the Prime Minister of
Jamaica on May 29, 1974).
165. Id. at 77. "If as part of the efforts made for their own development the States
which boast the same categories of resources carry on a policy of close cooperation on the
basis of full sovereignty and equal rights in their relationships with industrialized States, they
constitute an appreciable joint force." Id. (emphasis added). United, they may formulate
conditions of TNC investment to best serve their own development. Id.
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resource-holders will promote the formation of such associations.1 66
The realization that long-term benefits to all states will be pro-
moted and the bargaining power of all states vis-a-vis TNC's will be
increased, provides host states with an incentive to form such asso-
ciations. 167
International organizations among identical resource-holders
would allow developmental plans to be formulated to accommo-
date the specifics of development of each resource, and insure the
protection of host state developmental aspirations that the Code
attempts to guarantee. 6  These organizations should be formed
under the framework of the UN with the Code of Conduct serving
as the base point of permissible standards.16 9 Specific equity re-
quirements and percentages of repatriation and local management
could be tailored to encourage TNC development while still assur-
ing benefits to the resource-holding state. 170 International organiza-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 76-77. The problem inherent in such associations is the possibility that one
resource-holder will consider its own short-term interests above the collective guarantees of
the organization's stated terms. See C.F. BERGSTEN, supra note 10, at 140-41. Such a state is
engaging in "short-term risk-taking," rather than the promotion of long-term objectives and
is, in essence, undermining its own sovereignty rather than protecting it. Id. at 141-42;
Apter, supra note 15, at 2-3. A TNC would be wary of investing in such a state because such
investment would run the risk of uncertainty which a TNC seeks to avoid. See Impact, supra
note 1, at 40.
168. See G. ELIAN, supra note 145, at 77. When associations of states are set up on the
basis of common resource, a community of interest is derived "not only from the existence of
certain raw materials in certain developing countries, but also from the necessity of their own
development in specific ways which are demanded by the presence of the same types of
resources in other Member States." Id. A number of such international organizations have
been formed in recent years to strengthen the sovereignty of host states over natural resources.
Id, at 76. Among the most important raw materials groupings of this kind are: the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Association of Iron Ore Exporting
Countries (AIOEC), the International Bauxite Association (IBA), and the Council of Copper
Exporting Countries (CIPEC). Id. at 69, 75-76.
169. Id. at 80. "The necessary enhancement of the United Nations' role in the world,
the increase in the prestige of such meetings held within the United Nations and [the] rallying
• . . of States to discuss such important world problems would thus all be positive conse-
quences of organizing these meetings under the UN aegis." Id. The decisions adopted within
such a framework would have greater universality and authority and would therefore serve
as sources of inspiration for the elaboration of new principles of international law. Id.
170. See Issues Involved, supra note 1, para. 136, at 32. From the onset of Code
negotiations, states recognized the viability of provisions dealing with specific aspects of
developmental plans, such as repatriation, remittance and conditions of divestment. Id.
TNC TREATMENT
tions would be consistent with the UN's desire for a "practical
economic solution" to international exchange and cooperation,
wherein states "can cooperate to reconcile their conflicting inter-
ests, harmonize their policies for their mutual benefit, and achieve
a greater measure of international distributive justice."'' When
such organizations are formed under the aegis of the UN and pro-
vide for conformity with the precepts of the Code of Conduct, they
will permit effective functioning of the Code and achievement of
the principal purposes of the Code.
CONCLUSION
The three positions on host state treatment of TNC's in the UN
Code of Conduct are based on particular considerations unique to
each bloc.17 2 Only the LDC position is founded in principles which
have universal application to all blocs. 73
A legitimate and effective Code of Conduct for TNC's will be
achieved by adopting the LDC position of "qualified national treat-
ment," but further requiring national plans and objectives to be
clearly established. 174 This would give the TNC investment security
and would thereby be only a limited investment disincentive. Inter-
national organizations establishing uniform developmental plans
among identical resource-holders would protect the host states
against many of the abuses that a TNC's ability to select the most
favorable investment climate can present. 75 Such an arrangement
The developmental plans as formulated by the international organizations would have
to be amenable to some change. The final sentence of paragraph 50 of the Draft Code, supra
note 1, para. 50, would provide for this. Significant changes in market conditions, supply,
demand and world economic conditions would be factors warranting adaptation of stated
terms. Any change, however, would have to be clearly necessitated and specifically stated so
as to accommodate the TNC's concern for certainty. See supra notes 147-49 and accompany-
ing text. The factors justifying changes in developmental plans, such as significant changes in
market conditions, are factors which all corporations must adapt to as inherent risks of
investment.
171. World Development, supra note 1, at 3.
172. See supra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 127-54 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
1984]
500 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
would promote the development of a balanced economic world
order and enhance achievement of the purposes of the UN Code of
Conduct. 176
Rosanne M. Thomas
176. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
